IRAN Insights By AVI MELAMED

IRAN INSIGHTS BY AVI MELAMED

August 13, 2024

In the Shadow of the Threat of Escalation: A Possibility of a Surprising Positive Scenario of De-escalation

As global tensions rise with fears of a severe escalation of violence in the Middle East, driven by the possibility of a direct Iranian attack or proxy actions against Israel, observers in the region are questioning the apparent delay in Iran’s aggressive response. If this is indeed a strategic pause, I believe it reflects a significant dilemma within the Iranian regime, forcing them to reassess their next moves in this volatile situation. A report today quoting a senior Iranian official suggests that Iran’s planned retaliation may be scrapped if a ceasefire in Gaza is reached, confirming this analysis.

Both Iran and Hezbollah are facing a critical dilemma. Their decisions are deeply intertwined, ultimately hinging on Iran’s final decision and instructions. Iran must weigh the risks of directly retaliating against Israel for Haniyeh’s assassination, considering the potential for escalating conflict and the failure of previous retaliation efforts. Iran must decide whether Hezbollah should retaliate against Israeli strikes, risking a full-scale war that could destabilize Lebanon and weaken severely damage Hezbollah, its most crucial proxy. Given these dilemmas, they have good reasons to avoid escalation.

The big question is whether Iran and Hezbollah can back down from their itspublic threats to punish Israel—and if so, how it can do so without losing face?

Despite its radical and aggressive rhetoric, the Iranian mullah regime is capable of pragmatic decisions. A marathon runner deeply rooted in Shi’a beliefs, Iran’s strategic playbook includes camouflage, deception, disguise, and maneuvering as legitimate tools to use according to the circumstances and needs. Receptive and position itself as a reliable partner and interested in stability History shows the regime’s flexibility; during the 1980s, the grueling eight-year Iran-Iraq war ended in an peace agreement that Iran’s then-Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Khomeini, called a necessary “bitter pill” to swallow.

So, what could be a mechanism that enables the regime to avoid retaliation against Israel despite its threats, keep its face, and even harvest credit?

One potential solution to avoid retaliation while maintaining dignity could be the renewal of talks between Israel and Hamas, leading to a ceasefire.

Such an outcome could be framed as a success by all sides.

Iran could claim its restraint prompted Israel to seek a ceasefire out of fear of an Iranian attack. The mullah regime could argue its self-restraint is asserting its commitment to the well-being and protection of the Palestinians. Additionally, Iran could present itself as a reasonable actor open to dialogue, and willing to engage in diplomatic solutions.

Hezbollah has declared that it will cease its attacks on Israel once a ceasefire is achieved. If this happens, Hezbollah can claim it has achieved its goal, thereby avoiding the necessity of launching an attack that could lead to devastating Israeli retaliation.

Israel does not wish for escalation or the broadening and intensification of the conflict. A ceasefire would at least temporarily halt the escalation process. From Israel’s perspective, under these circumstances – given Iran’s interest in avoiding escalation and Sinwar’s need to be tuned to Iran’s interests, there is a window of opportunity to leverage the situation for a better deal. This could lead to an initial agreement to end the fighting and secure the release of Israeli hostages.

In the ongoing behind-the-scenes process aimed at preventing an escalation, Yahya Sinwar’s appointment as head of Hamas’s political bureau, following Ismail Haniyeh’s elimination in August in Tehran on June 31, 2024, is another facet of this complex equation.

Sinwar’s appointment likely had the blessing of the Iranian regime. While interested in escalating the conflict into a regional war, Sinwar has not fully achieved this goal. As someone close to Iran, under the current circumstances, he cannot ignore the regime’s interest in avoiding escalation. If a ceasefire deal now is indeed a way for the Iranian mullah regime to bypass its dilemma and keep face, Sinwar will not ignore that. Thus, the odds of an agreement increase.

Nonetheless, the situation remains volatile. The Iranian regime and Hezbollah continue to publicly commit to retaliating against Israel. Iran and Hezbollah’s threats are real. The outcomes of such an attack—if it occurs—will dictate the course of events. A severe outcome for Israel from such an attack—such as massive civilian casualties or significant damage to civilian infrastructure—would lead to a strong Israeli counter-response and an almost inevitable escalation.

August 10, 2024

In the Shadow of the Threat of Escalation – A Possibility of a Surprising Positive Scenario

As the world anxiously watches for escalating violence in the Middle East, particularly from a direct Iranian attack or its proxies targeting Israel, a surprising development could lower the threat level.

Israel, Hezbollah, and Iran each have strong incentives to avoid escalation of the conflict, leading to a convergence of interests to prevent escalation.

Resuming talks between Israel and Hamas could provide a way to save face for all parties, leading to a ceasefire. This ceasefire would help avoid further escalation and allow each party to present it as an achievement.

The Iranian regime could claim that its self-restraint forced Israel to seek a ceasefire out of fear of an Iranian attack. The mullah regime could argue its self-restraint is asserting its commitment to the well-being and protection of the Palestinians.

Hezbollah has declared that it will cease its attacks on Israel once a ceasefire is achieved. If this happens, Hezbollah can claim it has achieved its goal, thereby avoiding the necessity of launching an attack that could lead to devastating Israeli retaliation.

Israel does not wish for escalation or a broader conflict. A ceasefire would temporarily halt the escalation process, providing an opportunity to improve its bargaining position with Hamas, particularly concerning the first stage of an agreement to end the fighting and release Israeli hostages.

Yahya Sinwar’s appointment as head of Hamas’s political bureau adds another layer to this situation, an appointment that likely had the blessing of the Iranian regime.

Sinwar, while interested in escalating the conflict into a regional war, has not fully realized this goal. However, as someone close to Iran, he cannot ignore the regime’s interest in avoiding escalation under the current circumstances. For Sinwar, an agreement leading to a ceasefire is somewhat a bitter pill yet not necessarily a setback. He would continue to hold hostages, which would soften the immense criticism he faces among Palestinians and in the Arab world while gaining credit with the Iranian regime.

However, this possible scenario remains precarious. The Iranian regime and Hezbollah continue to publicly commit to retaliating against Israel. The outcomes of any such attack, if it occurs, will dictate the course of events. Should Israel suffer severe consequences, such as massive civilian casualties or significant infrastructure damage, a strong Israeli counter-response would be inevitable, leading to an almost certain escalation.

July 31, 2024

The Iranian Threat to Israel |  How a Few Hours Shuffled the Strategic Deck

The cornerstone of the Iranian regime’s strategy for the elimination of Israel is its network of proxies—Hezbollah in Lebanon, Iraqi Shia militias, Houthis in Yemen, and Hamas and Islamic Jihad in the Gaza Strip. The mission the Islamic Republic tasks these militias with is to wage a war of attrition against Israel. The strategy aims to gradually weaken Israel it and eventually destroy it through executing a coordinated, multifront assault attack. All the while, the Iranian regime and its key assets remain shielded from direct retaliation. So far, the plan has served the Iranian regime well. And from its perspective, the plan has been progressing in the right direction.

The elimination of Fuad Shakr, the head of the strategic military apparatus of Hezbollah and the person considered the number two in the organization, followed just a few hours later by the assassination of Hamas’ political bureau chief Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran, has reshuffled the deck regarding the Iranian threat to Israel. These high-profile eliminations have forced the Iranian regime into a critical juncture, presenting it with two severe dilemmas that demand immediate decisions.

The first dilemma Iran faces is determining how Hezbollah should respond to the Israeli surgical strike in the heart of its stronghold, al-Dahiya in the southern suburbs of Beirut.

If Hezbollah attacks major cities in Israel, such as Haifa and Tel Aviv, inflicting significant damage on civilian lives and critical infrastructure, a full-scale war will likely erupt. Iran currently seeks to avoid this scenario for two main reasons.

First, a full-scale war would likely push Lebanon, a failing state on the brink of collapse, toward its demise. This outcome would be detrimental to the Iranian regime, as Lebanon serves as a façade state under the control of Iran and Hezbollah, who rely on Lebanon to further their regional influence.

Second, a full-scale war with Israel would severely damage Hezbollah, the regime’s most critical proxy. From the Iranian perspective, Hezbollah has two primary missions: to maintain and entrench Iranian control in Lebanon, thereby securing Iran’s foothold on the Mediterranean coast, and to serve as a deterrent against any potential attacks on Iranian strategic assets.

Iran has effectively accepted severe damage to one of its proxies—the Hamas regime in Gaza. However, it will not tolerate significant damage to Hezbollah, its central operative. A full-scale war that severely impacts Hezbollah could force Iran into a direct military confrontation with Israel, potentially escalating into a broader conflict involving the U.S.

The second dilemma is whether the Iranian regime should respond directly against Israel for the elimination of Haniyeh in the heart of Tehran (despite Israel not claiming responsibility). This situation mirrors the Iranian response on the night of April 13-14, when Iran retaliated for the assassination of senior Revolutionary Guard officers in Damascus, which was attributed to Israel. In this context, the Iranian regime must consider three key factors.

First, the Iranian attack on April 13-14 was nearly completely thwarted by a U.S.-led coalition. Second, while Israel’s response to this attack was measured, it still caused significant practical and political embarrassment for the Iranian regime. A subsequent Iranian attack on Israel is likely to provoke a much harsher Israeli response. Third, the recent powerful Israeli strike on the Hodeida port in Yemen on July 20 occurred at a greater distance from Israel than the distance between Israel and Iran.

As these words are being written, frantic consultations are underway within and between the Iranian regime and Hezbollah. The pressing question is not whether a direct Iranian or Iran-supported militia response is imminent, but rather what its nature and consequences will be. The Hezbollah attack that resulted in the killing of Druze children in Majdal Shams on July 27 has sparked an escalation dynamic, disrupting the strategic landscape and bringing the region to the brink of a multi-front violent conflagration.

August 21, 2023

Is the U.S. taking off the glove in the Middle East Real or a PR?

Recent developments by the United States about the Iranian threat have perplexed regional observers. On the diplomatic front, the U.S. took a conciliatory turn, brokering a prisoner swap deal with Iran and releasing billions in frozen assets. A deal that does not help rehabilitate America’s weakening projection of power. Conversely, militarily, the U.S. has amplified its naval presence in the Arabian Gulf and the Red Sea. An additional 3,000 troops now safeguard maritime traffic. Additionally, accumulative information suggests that a U.S.-controlled buffer zone along the Iraq-Syria border has become a real action plan. This dichotomy begs the question as to whether the Biden administration is genuinely flexing its muscles, or is this merely a public relations strategy to counteract the negative optics of the Iran swap deal.

One possible reason for the US’ increased engagement is China’s deepening involvement in the region. As the U.S. appeared to waver in its commitment to counter the Iranian threat, allies like Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates grew increasingly disappointed with the American administration’s policy of containment. While regional powers became disheartened and increasingly skeptical about the reliability of their American ally, a power vacuum was created. China, with its expansive global ambitions, recognized this gap, swiftly stepping in to deepen its regional footprint.

If the U.S. is genuinely taking strong actions and not just posturing, the most notable move is its plan to set up a buffer zone between Iraq and Syria.

To achieve its hegemonic ambitions, Iran has strategically entrenched itself in Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon, striving to establish a continuous land corridor from its borders to the Mediterranean Sea.

In Iraq, Shi’ite militias loyal to Iran heavily influence Baghdad’s politics. These militias control the Abu Kamal / Al-Qa’im border crossing between Iraq and Syria. This dominance lets Iran move weapons and fighters from Iraq into Syria. On the Syrian side of this border, Iran set up the Imam Ali military logistical and weapons dept complex.

In war-torn Syria, Iranian-created and controlled Shi’ite militias from Afghanistan, Iraq, Lebanon, Pakistan, etc. have helped Iran gain control over east, west, and southwest Syria.

Moving to the western edge of the corridor, Iran via its most powerful proxy – Hezbollah completely controls the Syria-Lebanon “border,” – which in practice does not exist at all. Armed with Iranian weapons and funded by Tehran, Hezbollah has forcefully taken over Lebanon’s political and economic systems, turning the country into an extension of Iran.

The Iraq-Syria border crossing is a critical component of the Iranian-controlled corridor. A U.S.-controlled buffer zone at this crossing would compromise Iran’s objectives. The U.S. has assets and troops in three strategic areas all nearby. It has several military bases in Iraq, it has assets in the Kurdish-controlled area of northeast Syria, and its military base, Al-Tanf in Syria is in proximity to the triangle borders of Iraq, Jordan, and Syria. To Iran, this American presence is an affront. Over the past few years, Iranian proxies have repeatedly carried out attacks against these American bases in both Syria and Iraq. Recently, as part of its more assertive stance, the U.S. conveyed to the Iraqi government that it would respond to continued attacks on its bases by targeting the militias and their leaders.

How Does This Impact Israel?

Iran and its proxies present the most serious threat to the State of Israel. Iran’s battle plan for the elimination of Israel is based on the creation and entrenchment of a massive network of proxy armies with hundreds of thousands of missiles, rockets, and attack drones, which will create a ring of fire around Israel’s neck from three directions – Gaza, Lebanon and Syria.

The Iranian land corridor is a cornerstone of Iran’s plan.

Israel consistently acts to thwart the Iranian ring of fire plan by precise attacks on weapons depots, missile stockpiles, and an anti-aircraft system that Iran is trying to establish in Syria and near the Iraqi Syrian border.

The establishment of a buffer zone under U.S. control along the Syrian-Iraqi border is another important layer in the effort to thwart Iran’s plan to establish a ring of fire. Thwarting the Iranian plan is in the strategic interest of Israel and the U.S. because it will reduce the risk of a broad war between Israel and Iran and its proxies.

Possible Consequences of Removing the American Glove In The Middle East

In the intricate dance of Middle Eastern geopolitics, America’s next steps carry both promise and peril.

On the one side, by taking a firmer stance, the U.S. would reaffirm its commitment to regional allies, showcasing its undiminished influence in the Middle East and potentially deterring Iranian aggression. Yet, on the other, such assertiveness could fan the flames of conflict with Iranian-backed militias.

It begs the question of whether removing an American glove could lead to a direct military confrontation between the U.S. and Iran.

Historically, Iran has believed that the U.S. is hesitant about military action. A notable exception was in January 2020 when the U.S. targeted and killed Major-General Qassem Soleimani, a key figure in Iran’s military hierarchy. While Iran retaliated by attacking a U.S. base in Iraq, they were careful to avoid American casualties. This cautious approach suggests Iran wants to avoid an all-out war with the U.S.

As the sand continues to shift in the Middle East, sometimes, removing one glove can forestall the need to “remove two,” averting a more catastrophic outcome.

March 13, 2023

Immediate and Possible Ramifications of the Saudi – Iran Agreement

The Saudi-Iran agreement reflects, first and foremost, China’s growing presence and influence in the Middle East. Chinese policy is laser-focused, guided by two main interests – food and energy security. Hence, security and stability along the One Belt One Road maritime and land route are critical for the Chinese to meet their needs.

Throughout the Middle East, from the Persian/Arabian Gulf to the coast of the Mediterranean Sea, China is investing, increasing its foothold, grip—and influence in the region. The Chinese giant will not look favorably upon its investments and interests being harmed. Tensions and threats in the Persian / Arabian Gulf, the Red Sea, and the Eastern Mediterranean basin threaten China’s oil supplies, maritime trade routes, and increasing large-scale investments in the region. These are all critical components of China’s vision of domination. And no country will ignore China’s needs.

The Saudi – Iran agreement will likely have immediate impacts in different arenas. Iran is now formally committed to China’s interest in stability – at least in areas of utmost significance for China – the Persian/Arab Gulf, the Arab Sea, and the Red Sea.

The agreement has a couple of immediate ramifications in the foreseeable future.

One, Iran puts its nuclear program on hold.

Two, The Persian Gulf and the Red Sea will experience a period of calm in the near future after a long period of instability due to attacks by Iran and its proxies on naval vessels in the area and on oil infrastructures in Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates

Three, in Yemen, the ceasefire between the Iran-backed Houthi rebels and the Saudi-backed Yemeni government will be extended and likely expanded, and Houthi attacks on Saudi soil will cease.  

Four, the agreement speeds up the process of the return of the Assad regime to the Arab world. In this context, it is possible we will see more gestures on the part of Saudi Arabia towards the Assad regime.

Another significant arena that needs to be closely watched following the agreement is Iraq. China is massively invested in Iraqi oil fields. And Iraq has become China’s third-largest source of imported oil. More than half of the oil Iraq produces is exported to China. As an oil supplier, Iraq is of utmost importance to China. Therefore, stability in Iraq is crucial for China. Iranian grip on Iraq creates turbulence in Iraq, fueling tensions in Iraq between Iraqi nationalists and pro-Iranian Iraqi interventionists, thus resulting in escalating political instability in Iraq. That trajectory could lead to tension between Iran and China.

The Israeli Angle

In the Arab world as well as in other circles, the assessment is heard that the agreement harms Israel. One of the reasons for this assessment is that the agreement inhibits the dynamics of the Abraham Accords and blocks the continuation of the Israeli-Saudi dialogue. But I have a different opinion. The Israeli-Saudi dialogue will continue as it has so far in a slow and low-profile process because Saudi Arabia, which is very threatened by Iran, will not drop the Israeli card.

In addition, in my opinion, the agreement serves Israel in three aspects in the visible future.

First, the agreement inhibits or at least greatly slows down Iran’s progress to nuclear weapons, at least in the foreseeable time frame.

Second, calm in the Persian / Arab Gulf arena to meet China’s need for stability serves Israel because so far, Iran has used the card of violence and attacks against vessels in the Gulf area (including Israeli-owned vessels) in part in an attempt to create a deterrent balance that will cause Israel to stop its attacks against Iranian targets in Syria. Following the agreement, this card fell out of Iran’s hands – at least for the foreseeable future.

Third, the agreement could also reduce in the visible future the potential for a wide military round between Israel and Gaza. The agreement surprised Hamas and the Islamic Jihad organization supported by Iran. It seems that in the near future, these organizations will try to understand the consequences of the agreement on their activities and their means. In light of this, and in light of the fact that the month of Ramadan begins in about a week, the potential for a wide-scale military flare-up between Israel and the Gaza Strip in the near term is significantly reduced, even if clashes between Israel and Palestinian militants in the West Bank continue.

 March 10, 2023

Today’s news about China bringing Saudi Arabia and Iran a bit closer and their commitments to restore their embassies not only makes headlines about those two nations but also will likely have reverberations throughout the region and global politics. At a first glance, it shows that its extremely likely that Iran is committing to cease its advancement towards nuclear armaments- a red line in the sand that both China and Saudi Arabia are strong opponents of. It also shows the growing Chinese influence in the Middle East.

There will be other ramifications I’m sure we will see over the days and weeks ahead, specifically likely in Syria and Yemen. While some may think that this might signal that this blocks any chance of a Saudi-Israel path to relations, it’s highly likely that given the Saudi’s experience and knowledge of how the Iranian regime operates, it’s highly likely they will continue to keep their options open vis-a-vis normalizing relations with Israel.

December 24, 2022

Iran’s vision of an Iranian fully-controlled Iranian Land Corridor stretching from Iran through Iraq and Syria and ending up in Lebanon is facing serious obstacles. To that, one should add the ongoing uprising inside Iran. In my evaluation, the mullah regime will refrain in the foreseeable future from any dramatic move that could accelerate a US decision to act militarily against its nuclear program. Thus, I evaluate that in the foreseeable future, Iran will continue its policy of walking on the edge with regard to its nuclear program, yet it will not cross specific red lines.

PREDICTION:        I evaluate that in the foreseeable future, Iran will continue its policy of walking on the edge with regard to its nuclear program, yet it will not cross specific red lines in an attempt to prevent a military strike on Iran.

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