Syria: Western Kurdistan (Rojava) Episode 4 | AiTME #21

Syria: Western Kurdistan (Rojava) Episode 4 | AiTME #21 | An article by Avi Melamed | Podcast version powered by Ai.

Demography and Major Geographic Areas

Syrian Kurds constitute approximately 10–15% of Syria’s population (around 2–2.5 million people before the war). They are concentrated mainly in northern and northeastern Syria, along the Turkish border, in three non-contiguous areas:

· Jazira (Hasakah Governorate) in the northeast

· Kobane (ʿAyn al-Arab) along the Euphrates

· Afrin, northwest of Aleppo (west of the Euphrates)

The Kurds are not demographically dominant across all of Rojava; Arab, Assyrian, Armenian, and Turkmen communities form significant minorities, particularly in Jazira. Qamishli, the main urban center of Jazira, functions as the administrative capital and had an estimated 400,000 residents before the war.

Historical Background of Syrian Kurds

In the early 20th century, Kurdish aristocrats fleeing repression in Turkey settled in Damascus. In the 1950’s amid rising Arab nationalism, bans on Kurdish language and culture, and systematic discrimination, Syrian Kurds established local Kurdish movement—the Kurdistan Democratic Party of Syria (KDP-S)

In 1962, the Syrian government arbitrarily stripped 120,000–150,000 Kurds (around one-fifth of the Kurdish population) of citizenship, claiming they were illegal migrants from Turkey. Two categories emerged:

· Ajanib (“foreigners”), registered but stateless

· Maktumin, unregistered and legally “non-existent”

Both groups were denied basic civil rights, including property ownership, marriage to citizens, political participation, and freedom of movement. In 2011, Bashar al-Assad granted citizenship to many ajanib to neutralize Kurdish dissent; most maktumin remain stateless.

Syria, the PKK, and Turkey (1980s–1998)

From the 1980s until 1998, Syria under Hafez al-Assad cooperated with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) as part of its confrontation with Turkey. Damascus hosted PKK infrastructure and allowed Abdullah Öcalan to operate from Syria and Lebanon’s Beqaa Valley, using the organization as leverage over disputes involving the Euphrates waters, borders, and Turkey’s Western alignment. This arrangement ended in 1998, when Turkish military pressure forced Syria to expel Öcalan, leading to the Adana Agreement and a temporary de-escalation.

Rise of the PYD and Kurdish Mobilization

In 2003, the Democratic Union Party (PYD) was founded as a PKK-aligned Syrian Kurdish party. Syrian authorities responded with arrests, torture, and repression. Tensions erupted during the 2004 Qamishli uprising, triggered by violence at a football match between Arab- and Kurdish-supported teams. Though suppressed within days, the episode marked a political awakening among Syrian

Kurds.

Syrian Kurds Autonomy – the Rojava Governance

Rojava originally consisted of three cantons—Jazira, Kobane, and Afrin—covering an area roughly the size of Connecticut, with an estimated 4.6 million inhabitants at its peak. The region is resource-poor, ethnically mixed, and deeply affected by displacement; roughly 20% of Syrian Kurds became refugees in Turkey and Iraq.

Rojava developed an unusual power-sharing model through TEV-DEM (Movement for a Democratic Society) designed to prevent domination by any single group. All governing bodies—from local councils to regional administrations—operate under a mandatory co-chair system, pairing one woman and one man, often from different ethnic backgrounds (typically Kurdish and Arab). This structure is mirrored across political, administrative, and security institutions.

In parallel, Rojava institutionalized ethnic inclusion, formally integrating Kurds, Arabs, Assyrians, and other minorities into decision-making bodies, while granting women autonomous councils with veto power on gender-related issues. The model aims to decentralize authority, limit patriarchal control, and foster cross-communal cooperation—making Rojava’s governance system one of the most socially experimental political frameworks to emerge from the Syrian war.

In 2016, the “Democratic Federation of Rojava–North Syria” adopted a constitution rejecting the nation-state model, allowing foreign relations, and instituting mandatory military service.

Security institutions include:

· People’s Protection Units (YPG) – ~50,000 fighters

· YPJ (Women’s Protection Units) – ~10,000 fighters

· Asayish – internal security force (~6,000 personnel)

During the Syrian war, Kurds exploited the regime’s withdrawal from the north to establish de facto autonomy. Militarily, YPG forces—later embedded within the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF)—became the West’s primary local partner against Islamic State (ISIS). They played a decisive role in dismantling ISIS’s territorial “caliphate” by 2019, and later in containing ISIS remnants and guarding detention camps.

Kurdish success prompted repeated Turkish military interventions (2016–2019), resulting in the loss of Afrin and parts of the border zone. Relations with Damascus remained pragmatic and transactional, avoiding open conflict while rejecting reintegration.

Status of Kurdish Autonomy (Early 2026)

As of early 2026, Syrian Kurdish autonomy remains limited, fragmented, and highly vulnerable. The SDF continues to control large parts of northeastern Syria, but:

· Turkey maintains military pressure and a buffer zone along the border

· U.S. commitment is strategically ambiguous and politically constrained

· Damascus seeks gradual reintegration without granting genuine federalism

· Economic hardship, war fatigue, and governance challenges persist

Rojava survives not as a recognized autonomous entity, but as a contested, externally dependent political-military space, whose long-term viability depends on regional power balances rather than internal consolidation.

Rojava’s fate is inseparable from Turkey’s Kurdish question. Ankara’s perception of Syrian Kurdish autonomy as an extension of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) conflict is key to understanding both its interventions in Syria and the limits of Kurdish self-rule—bringing us directly to the Kurds in Turkey, the focus of the next episode.

This article is also available as a Podcast: the AiTME Podcast. This Podcast was written and created by Avi Melamed, Middle East Intelligence Analyst and Founder of Inside The Middle East [ITME], an institute dedicated to apolitical, non-partisan education about the Middle East.

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Syria: Western Kurdistan (Rojava) Episode 4 | AiTME #21 | An article by Avi Melamed | Podcast version powered by Ai.

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